Clandestine project threatens nuclear non-proliferation

February 9, 2005
Issue 

Looking at a map of the world, where would you expect to find a clandestine nuclear project? A project shrouded in secrecy that is attempting to make the process of enriching uranium cheaper, easier and more mobile? An attempt to develop technology that in 1981 the CIA reported could be used to "set up a garage-sized plant to produce weapon-grade uranium anywhere in the world"?

It's happening in our backyard, in Sydney's leafy southern suburbs. Silex Systems Ltd, in conjunction with the Australian government, is involved in a highly classified project to develop "separation of isotopes by laser excitation" (Silex) at Lucas Heights.

Silex, which is registered on the Australian Stock Exchange, is attempting to revolutionise the process of enriching uranium, using lasers in place of traditional centrifuge methods.

"If they actually get it to work then they are sitting on some knowledge that is potentially incredibly dangerous", James Courtney, anti-nuclear campaigner for Greenpeace Australia, told 91×ÔÅÄÂÛ̳ Weekly on January 30.

Whereas no country has constructed traditional facilities for enriching uranium undetected, Courtney pointed out that lasers have the potential to do the job without emitting the "signatures" that lead to detection. These include waste gases, ultra-high frequencies from huge numbers of spinning centrifuges and the considerable size and power consumption of current plants.

It is feared that successfully developing the technology will pose significant new risks for the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute stated as early as 1983: "There can be no doubt that continued progress in laser isotope separation will greatly complicate efforts to control nuclear weapon proliferation." It is a sentiment that continues to echo distinctly across the landscape of contemporary global politics.

Technology of this kind is considered "dual use" because it has applications in both the nuclear power and weapons industries. Similar attempts have been made and scrapped in France, Japan and the US, leaving Australia as the only country doggedly pursuing the dream, born of a project that the government began in 1978.

In a November statement, Silex said that the technology it is developing "is now and always will be heavily regulated by Australian and US government authorities" and that it "does not contribute to nuclear proliferation". The process it is working on is "fundamentally completely different" to what has been tried elsewhere, "and has a real chance of success".

The statements were made in response to a report released on November 30 by Greenpeace entitled Secrets, Lies and Uranium Enrichment, which casts a shadow over Silex operations. The report claims that the Australian government relinquished an overt role in the project with the sale of the technology to Silex in 1994, although no details of this sale have been disclosed publicly.

In addition, Silex is the only private company registered to the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, but no mention has ever been made of Silex in ARPANSA reports. Nor was the company mentioned in an environmental impact statement in 1998 for the replacement reactor at Lucas Heights, despite the requirement to detail all nuclear activities on the site.

The Greenpeace report claims the project was so sensitive that it required government intimations at the highest level. In May 2000, foreign affairs minister Alexander Downer announced the "Silex Agreement" with the US. It allowed the two countries to cooperate on the venture in ways that were previously forbidden under the bilateral Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy agreement that came into effect in 1981. The Silex project was classified as "restricted data" in the United States, a classification that reputedly usually refers to nuclear weapons technology.

Following the agreement, Silex benefited from $2,376,300 in Australian government funding, while the United States Enrichment Corporation chipped in with approximately $29 million over a period of years. USEC withdrew from the deal in 2003.

After USEC's departure, Silex CEO Dr Michael Goldsworthy announced at the 2003 annual general meeting that the company had engaged in "several meetings with Mr Downer who was helping to open doors overseas for the company", according to Courtney, who attended the meeting.

Greenpeace also contends that in 2003 the government made amendments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987. The changes restricted ARPANSA, which is the independent regulator, from ever revealing any information regarding Silex operations.

In the foreword to the Greenpeace report, Dr Frank Barnaby, a prominent nuclear physicist, wrote: "The Australian government's support of this technology undermines its stated commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Furthermore, conducting this research in a nuclear facility that the public is told is mainly engaged in medical research is hypocritical."

From 91×ÔÅÄÂÛ̳ Weekly, February 9, 2005.

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