
Indignation and resistance to United States President Donald Trump鈥檚 bullying, deportations and economic reprisals are spreading across Latin America.
The mainstream media has amply covered pushback from Canada and Western Europe and the street protests and town halls in the US 鈥 along with the Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez-Bernie Sanders 鈥淔ighting Oligarchy鈥 tour. However, it has not given much attention to the growing defiance to the south.
Opposition to Trump throughout Latin America is taking on many forms. In places such as Mexico, presidents have forged a united front over US tariffs with prominent businesspeople and some opposition leaders. Diplomatic initiatives by other presidents, such as Lula of Brazil, are aiming to build a unified Latin American stand against Trump鈥檚 measures by shoring up regional organisations, principally the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).
The opposition has also included street mobilisations. Most recently, Panamanians reacted to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth鈥檚 visit on April 12 by taking to the streets. The National Front for the Defense of Economic and Social Rights (Frenadeso) 鈥 one of the main sponsors 鈥 denounced Washington鈥檚 veiled schemes to establish four military bases in the country. Frenadeso also denounced Jos茅 Ra煤l Mulino Quintero鈥檚 capitulation to US pressure that resulted in Panama鈥檚 exit from China鈥檚 Belt and Road Initiative.
Three issues have galvanised the pushback against Trump in Latin America: tariffs, deportations and Washington鈥檚 policy of exclusion. The latter includes ostracising Cuba and Venezuela from the Latin American community of nations as well as rhetoric and actions designed to drive China from the continent.
Trump鈥檚 policies have intensified the polarisation in Latin America that pits left and centre-left governments against the far right, which is closely aligned with Washington and Trump in particular. They also stimulate anti-Americanism, which according to Bloomberg columnist Juan Pablo Spinetto, is 鈥 new life in Latin America鈥.
Defeat at the OAS
Suriname鈥檚 Albert Ramdin was elected secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS) on March 10, after his only competitor, Paraguay鈥檚 foreign minister Rub茅n Ram铆rez Lezcano, dropped out of the race.
Reporting on the event, the mainstream media largely took their cue from the claim by the White House鈥檚 Latin American envoy Mauricio Claver-Carone, that " Secretary General will be an ally of the United States". He added that Ramdin鈥檚 government is 鈥 path economically 鈥 That鈥檚 bringing in foreign investments that鈥檚 non-Chinese.鈥
Nothing could be further from the truth. Ramdin opposes US sanctions and favours dialogue with the Venezuelan government of Nicol谩s Maduro. In contrast, his rival, Ram铆rez, had pledged to promote regime change in Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua.
Furthermore, China, with its OAS observer status, had supported Ramdin鈥檚 candidacy, while the right-wing, pro-Trump governments of Argentina and El Salvador backed Ram铆rez. Ramdin defends the 鈥渙ne China鈥 policy; in a 2006 trip to Beijing, he stated that his goal was to " and deepen" the relationship between China and the OAS, that he evidently continues to support.
Ramdin owes his nomination not only to the unanimous support of Caribbean nations, but also the joint endorsement by the progressive governments of Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile.
If the past is any indication, the Trump administration may attempt to blackmail the OAS by threatening to reduce its contributions to the organisation, currently representing 60% of its budget. In fact, some Trump have privately raised that possibility, and Washington has already frozen 鈥渧oluntary contributions鈥 to the OAS.
Challenging the Hegemon
After Trump announced a 25% tariff on Mexican and Canadian imports, Mexico鈥檚 president Claudia Sheinbaum called a rally for March 6 at Mexico City鈥檚 central plaza to announce retaliatory measures. Although Trump postponed the tariffs, Sheinbaum held the rally anyway and converted it into a festival to celebrate Washington鈥檚 turnaround.
In front of an estimated crowd of 350,000 Mexicans, some of whom held signs reading 鈥淢exico is to be respected鈥, Sheinbaum said: 鈥 extremists, but we are clear that 鈥 we cannot cede our national sovereignty 鈥 as a result of decisions by foreign governments or hegemons.鈥
The showdown with Trump has helped forge a 鈥渃ommon front鈥, a term used by Francisco Cervantes D铆az, president of Mexico鈥檚 main business organisation, who pledged that more than 300 businesspeople would attend the rally. Some members of the Mexican opposition to Sheinbaum and her ruling Morena party also took part.
But the nation鈥檚 two main traditional parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National Action Party (PAN), refused to unite behind the president.
Sheinbaum's decisiveness resonated in Mexico, with her approval rating climbing to . Her reaction to Trump stood in sharp contrast with the submissiveness of Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau, who immediately headed to Mar-a-Lago after Washington first announced the tariff hikes. Panama鈥檚 Mulino also buckled under.
Immediately following Trump鈥檚 initial tariff announcement, Lula and Sheinbaum spoke by phone on the need to strengthen CELAC to serve as an alternative to US commercial ties. The collective approach to tariffs that the progressive Latin American governments are now proposing, with Lula at the helm, is diametrically opposed to the bilateral agreements that the US has pushed in the region since 2005. That year, Latin American progressive presidents, led by Hugo Ch谩vez, delivered US-style multilateralism in the form of the Free Trade Area of the Americas proposal (FTAA) a fatal blow, much to the chagrin of then president George W Bush.
The polarisation that pits progressive governments, which favour Latin America unity, against those on the right, which sign bilateral trade agreements with Washington, was on full display at CELAC鈥檚 ninth summit held in Honduras in April. The rightist presidents of Argentina, Paraguay, Peru and Ecuador were conspicuously absent, while those on the left side of the spectrum, representing Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Honduras and Venezuela, participated.
Especially significant was Lula鈥檚 insistence that countries in the region move away from the dollar by trading in local currencies. In an obvious reference to Trump, Lula said, 鈥淭he more united our economies are, the more protected we are from unilateral actions.鈥 The summit鈥檚 host, Honduran president Xiomara Castro de Zavala, remarked, 鈥淲e cannot leave this historic assembly 鈥 without debating the new economic order that the United States is imposing on us with tariffs and immigratory policies.鈥
Polarisation hurts the right
Trump鈥檚 policies have intensified the extreme polarisation in which the far right has replaced the centre right at the same time the left has gained influence. A case in point is Venezuela. The deportation of 238 Venezuelans from the US to an overcrowded for-profit prison in El Salvador, and others to Guantanamo, has horrified Venezuelans.
Some have taken to the street to protest, including scores of family members holding photos of victims. One typical sign read 鈥淛hon William Chac铆n G贸mez 鈥 He鈥檚 Innocent.鈥 wife and sister told reporters that his only crime was his tattoos. In a show of pro-Venezuelan solidary and in defiance of the repressive atmosphere that exists in the nation, protesters in El Salvador also hold signs with photos of individual Venezuelan prisoners.
The issue of deportations has divided the Venezuelan opposition, more than it already is. The hard-line opposition that supported the candidacy of Mar铆a Corina Machado and then her surrogate Edmundo Gonz谩lez is now split. In April, the two-time presidential candidate Henrique Capriles was expelled from one of the nation鈥檚 major parties, Primero Justicia, due to his differences with the pro-Trump Machado, one of them being on the issue of the deportations. Capriles asked with regard to Venezuelan deportees, 鈥 is their crime? What is the criteria for proving it?鈥 He went on to demand 鈥渞espect for human rights鈥, adding 鈥渋t is unacceptable to characterise all [Venezuelan] migrants as delinquents鈥.
The irony of Trump鈥檚 Monroe Doctrine
It's ironic that the 21st-century president who proclaims the as the cornerstone of US policy south of the border is distancing Latin America so much from Washington.
Events since Trump took office that portend a worsening of relations between the two include the election of an OAS secretary general who doesn鈥檛 share Trump鈥檚 objectives and may result in Washington鈥檚 defunding of the organisation or its complete withdrawal; Trump鈥檚 remarks that display complete insensitivity to nationalist sentiment in the region; his weaponisation of tariffs that single out Venezuela and Nicaragua for special treatment and serves as a warning for governments such as Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay; the gutting of foreign aid programs; and mass deportations.
If Latin America does move away from the US camp, the blame can鈥檛 be placed entirely on Trump. His bullying is just a more extreme version of the imperialism that has always characterised US actions south of the border. Progressive governments in the region now seem more determined than ever to put a check on it.
[A version of this article appeared in Jacobin. Steve Ellner is an Associate Managing Editor of Latin American Perspectives and a retired professor at the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela, where he lived for more than 40 years. His latest book is his co-edited Latin American Social Movements and Progressive Governments: Creative Tensions Between Resistance and Convergence.]