Sam Gindin is a former research director for the Canadian Auto Workers union and coauthor of (with Leo Panitch), among other works.
In the second part of our interview, 91自拍论坛鈥檚 Federico Fuentes spoke to Gindin about the impact of United States President Donald Trump鈥檚 tariff war on workers, and how they can respond. Read part one here.
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Does the US capitalist class support Trump鈥檚 tariffs?
US capital looked to Trump to give them more of the usual goodies 鈥 significantly lower taxes, reversing regulations on capital (limited as they were), further limits on social programs 鈥 while blocking any advances in union rights.
Trump promised to impose high tariffs, but US corporations saw this as only performative; they did not think Trump was mad enough to implement this part of his rhetoric.
Tariffs do not just limit non-US capital. They directly and negatively affect US capital operating overseas, overseas supply chains affecting production in the US, and 鈥 assuming some retaliation 鈥 access to markets abroad.
They raise the price of components and goods that they ship from abroad into the US.
They also threaten to raise inflation, risk supply chain disruptions and retaliation, aggravate business uncertainties (especially Trump鈥檚 on-again, off-again, maybe-later-again arbitrariness) and make a recession more likely.
So no, this is not something business was looking for.
Is that why Trump hit pause on most of his announced tariffs?
Absolutely. The hubris of Trump and his advisors in bullying friends and allies abroad and expecting quick gains was quickly exposed.
US business had been relatively silent but 鈥渕arkets鈥 clearly spoke: stock markets sank, the sale of US Treasuries (government borrowing) faced higher interest rates, and the US dollar fell.
A sobered Trump retreated to focus more on China. But even here Trump quickly retreated on Apple iPhones imported from China.
Trump declared tariffs would be a tax on foreigners and shift costs abroad. But since the extraordinary tariffs on China would have led to an explosion in iPhone prices (or simply resulted in them not being shipped to the US), this caused a mini-rebellion among US consumers.
So, Trump retreated, essentially admitting the obvious: tariffs were a tax that would largely be paid by Americans.
Selectively applied tariffs that are part of a larger strategy can have an impact. But tariffs as a shotgun approach, insensitive to the complex realities of capitalism鈥檚 global links, and with the delusion of a quick fix, cannot fulfill their promises.
Are Trump鈥檚 tariffs therefore about trying to legitimise his project among workers?
I do not know if it completely explains Trump鈥檚 motivations 鈥 there is a great deal of ignorance and bad economics in Trump鈥檚 head 鈥 but I do think tariffs reinforce Trump鈥檚 frenzied hyper-tariff political agenda.
This agenda speaks to US nationalism. It diverts attention from the domestic war on workers and how workers鈥 lives could be far more significantly improved through domestic changes (universal healthcare, substantive access to higher education, affordable de-commodified housing, union rights) than tariffs.
It tried to convince US workers that tariffs would replace the need for domestic taxes, and that the promised tax cuts for the rich would therefore not undermine social programs.
It also reinforces the Cold War on China.
But it must be kept in mind that tariffs themselves are not Trump鈥檚 main goal; they are only a tool for leverage in changing the larger distribution of costs and benefits within global capitalism to make it 鈥渇airer鈥 to the US.
Whether he can wring some pro-US changes out of his tariff madness and then exit tariffs, declaring that it was those other changes (for example, others paying a larger share of NATO鈥檚 costs and buying more equipment from the US, or an upward adjustment to the renminbi) remains to be seen.
But along the way other problems may hit the US and negatively impact the US empire.
How should working-class forces respond to Trump鈥檚 tariff war?
A difficult question. I will flag some suggested orientations.
First, as noted earlier, domestic issues 鈥 what our governments have done or neglected to do for us 鈥 have had a much greater impact on working-class lives than the import of cheaper products from abroad.
We must not let this be pushed aside by the focus on tariffs.听
Second, it is not all that helpful to simply criticise workers鈥 support for tariffs.
The alternative of no tariffs means free trade, which has augmented capital鈥檚 freedoms to allocate its investment and jobs according to its own, undemocratic, priorities. Free trade has been part of weakening and harming the working class.听
Tariffs can potentially play a positive role but 鈥 and here is the rub 鈥 only if they are part of broader policies to restructure the economy in a socially beneficial way.
A short detour to the Ronald Reagan administration鈥檚 response to the auto crisis in the mid-80s might help clarify this point.
Reagan used trade pressures to force Japanese companies to shift from exports to establishing plants in the US. Autoworkers, desperate for some security, cheered the state for 鈥渄oing something concrete鈥.
But Japanese auto companies did not go where the job losses were. They went to the non-union US south.
With their brand-new plants, absence of legacy pensions costs, and no pressure to incorporate workers鈥 rights, they outcompeted the plants in the US north.
Jobs did come to the US, but unionised autoworkers were no more secure than before. Soon, these Japanese plants, not the United Auto Workers, were effectively setting standards for the industry.
Today, auto is no longer the job creator it was. The market for new cars is relatively saturated. That, combined with the steady beat of productivity improvements, spells fewer jobs.
As electric vehicles (EVs) 鈥 which require less hours of labour per vehicle 鈥 replace gas-propelled vehicles, the outlook for jobs is further downgraded.
Add to this that the transition to EVs will have to occur, but the US badly lags China despite being so far ahead a few short years ago, and it is hard to see tariffs on their own being much of a solution.
Third, we must not fetishise manufacturing jobs as inherently 鈥済ood鈥 jobs. They have historically had the best pay and benefits, but only by way of workers unionising into militant, creative unions.
Moreover, the quality of manufacturing jobs has significantly fallen and, in any case, only some 10% of jobs in the US and Canada (less in Australia) are now in the manufacturing sector.
Improving the status and quality of service jobs 鈥 the jobs many workers in manufacturing will someday have and their kids will most likely have 鈥 is the critical challenge.
Fourth, manufacturing capacity is nevertheless crucial to all countries as part of their restructuring to meet changing needs.
This is especially the case regarding the environment. Addressing the environmental crisis demands transforming everything about how we work, travel and live.
This implies having the tools and products to transform factories, housing, infrastructures.
To let facilities close because they do not earn enough profits would in this case be criminal; we need to hang on to these and convert them into producing, by way of national plans, what is socially valuable.
This does not mean rejecting trade or some degree of specialisation in particular products. But it does mean both managed or planned economic development and managed, mutually beneficial trade.
In short, the problems workers face require more than tinkering with the status quo. They call for finally recognising that a socio-economic system based on corporations competing for profits cannot bring workers more secure and fulfilling lives.
This is not just a matter of listing better policies but a fundamental question of where power lies and how power itself is transformed.
The bottom line is how to build the working-class into a social force with the vision, commitment, confidence and collective organising skills to change the world.听
[Read the full interview on .]
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