Sri Lanka鈥檚 ruling National People鈥檚 Power (NPP) party won 43% of the vote in the May 6 . The NPP won 265 out of 336 local governing bodies, including 41 urban and 24 municipal councils.
This was an important victory, reaffirming the popular support for the coalition built by working-class party, the National Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, JVP).
The NPP represents a democratic transition from 48 years of authoritarian rule. However it has a contradictory commitment to a neoliberal capitalist economy, implementing an International Monetary Fund-advocated debt restructuring program.
The main opposition party, United Peoples Power (Samagi Jana Balawegaya, SJB), won only 14 local government bodies, with around 22 % of the vote. The SJB is a split-off from the United National Party (UNP), led by Sajith Premadasa, the son of former President Ranasinghe Premadasa (1988鈥93).
UNP leader Ranil Wickremasinghe was previously installed as President by the Rajapaksa-dominated parliament, following the 2022 popular uprising that forced the resignation of former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. The UNP gained only 5% of the vote in the local elections, while the Rajapaksa party, Sri Lankan People鈥檚 Front (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, SLPP), gained around 9% of the vote.
The elections sent a clear signal that voters do not trust the parties of the ruling elites that have dominated representative politics since independence in 1948.
The loss of NPP votes to regional Tamil parties in the North and Muslim parties in the East is reflective of Sinhala-Buddhist tendencies within the JVP. In the North the military continues to occupy land belonging to local Tamil communities. Electoral promises by the NPP remain unfulfilled, such as: releasing all Tamil political prisoners; addressing cases of disappearances; repealing the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and a making a genuine effort towards reconciliation and remedying the demands of marginalised Tamil and Muslim communities.
Cultures of political violence
While there were , the absence of electoral violence before and after the poll is a key strength of the NPP government. In the previous local government elections in , the Rajapaksa party won around 45% of the vote and 231 local bodies, in a context of a parliamentary minority. A few weeks after the elections, the Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-nationalist groups, encouraged by the ruling Rajapaksa party, launched .
A key characteristic of the Rajapaksa regime (2004鈥15 and 2019鈥22) was the inclusion of local strongmen and thugs as candidates in local elections. The links between political parties and local criminal gangs goes back to the launch of the market-driven economy in 1977 by the UNP. During a major strike in 1980, the UNP鈥檚 trade union mobilised thugs to attack other unions.
Elected representatives of the Rajapaksa party using party funds to buy votes and syphoned off public funds set aside for development projects through bribery, misuse of funds, nepotism and awarding contracts to allies.
Some of these representatives also engaged in illegal extraction of natural resources, such as sand, rocks and timber, and illicit alcohol production.
Meanwhile, local police and the legal system, influenced by party politics, maintained the culture of impunity and violence.
Local government elected representatives from the Rajapaksa party were among the thugs who attacked the popular uprising, on May 9, 2022. They faced an unexpected retaliation from local communities sympathetic to the non-violent protesters. Nevertheless, a few of them recontested the recent local elections.
The absence of major electoral violence is a significant achievement in changing the culture of representative politics. This is significant given Sri Lanka has a heavily militarised state, with former soldiers and deserters often forced into criminal activities in a context of high cost of living, increasing household debt and lack of meaningful employment with a living wage.
NPP鈥檚 Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and social welfare
The NPP鈥檚 effort towards a social democratic agenda is restrained by its commitment to an IMF-driven debt restructuring strategy. The NPP/JVP is building a 鈥減opular-national鈥 project, based on alliances with a range of actors across business, media, religion, arts, academia, think-tanks, civil society and trade unions.
A recent example of JVP鈥檚 reassertion of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism was the state-sanctioned spectacle of displaying the for the general public in late April.
Following this religious spectacle, the NPP went on to organise a massive May Day rally at the Galle Face green, in the capital Colombo, with a stage decorated with the hammer and sickle symbol. This was the same place occupied by the people during the 2022 popular uprising. The was about national unity, a strong public service and the rule of law. Most other major parties held indoor events, with the SJB meeting held in the tea plantation areas.
The NPP government has expanded welfare benefits and raised the from Rs 21,000 (A$105) to Rs27,000 (A$135). Meanwhile, the average monthly wage is about Rs55,000 (A$ 275). According to the , the proportion of the population living in poverty is projected to remain above 25% in the next few years.
Tamil tea plantation workers in the central hill country, earn below the minimum wage, on average. Most of these households are also in severe debt and poverty. The marketing ads for tea and tourism in the hill country hide the human suffering that has endured since colonisation.
The Frontline Socialist Party, which also contested the local government elections under the Peoples Struggle Alliance (PSA), gained 16 seats in different local governments. The PSA remains the main critical voice demanding that the NPP sticks to the promise of a democratic transition. The critique of the NPP from mainstream parties is aimed at establishing the previous form of elite rule, entrenched in corruption and authoritarian politics.
The PSA continues to highlight the NPPs lack of a genuine reconciliation agenda for addressing the grievances of the Tamil and Muslim communities, the capitulation to the IMF agenda and to Indian expansionist interests.
India alliance
The visit by Indian Prime Minister in early April led to the signing of a new defence agreement, without any transparency, deepening military ties with India. The JVP launched an armed insurrection in 1987 against the presence of Indian troops, which had been invited by the then-UNP government, to address the impasse of the anti-Tamil civil war at the time. The insurrection resulted in an unprecedented 鈥渢error period鈥 (1988鈥89) of state violence that led to more than 60,000 deaths 鈥 mostly of Sinhalese youths in the South.
The ongoing mobilisation of Tamil as well as Sinhala families and relatives of the forcibly disappeared directly relates to the demand of demilitarisation, which is central to reinforcing democratic institutions as well as human rights.
Democratic transition
With a majority in the parliament and in local government, the NPP is well positioned to undertake systemic change aimed at strengthening democracy and human rights.
However, it is also important to recognise the NPPs鈥 compromises with the IMF, along with the opposition elitist ruling class parties鈥 efforts 鈥 with their allies in the media, religious communities and technocracy 鈥 to undermine the NPP.
Meanwhile, the escalation of armed conflict between India and Pakistan, following the Indian missile attacks on Pakistan on May 7, is likely to reinforce militarisation as well as patriarchal ethno-nationalist authoritarian forces within the region.
These new developments illustrate further constraints to the NPP鈥檚 democratic transition in Sri Lanka, but also the need for unity among people across the region in demanding peace and demilitarisation.
In effect, strengthening parties like the PSA and the democratic social movements 鈥 including the labour movement and civil society activist networks 鈥 is central to deepening the democratic transition the NPP has promised.