
Cables sent from the US Embassy in Quito during Rafael Correa鈥檚 first three years as president document rising tensions between Ecuador and the US.
Correa鈥檚 government, first elected in 2006, increasingly rejected US hegemony and asserted control over Ecuador鈥檚 economic and political development.
The cables highlight the embassy鈥檚 preoccupation with Ecuador鈥檚 鈥渄ifficult investment climate鈥, with many reports attempting to assess and predict Correa鈥檚 economic policies.
The embassy worried the Correa government would exclude the private sector from decision-making, and implement economic policies that would negatively affect US and other foreign investors in Ecuador.
To encourage Correa to 鈥渇ollow responsible and sustainable macroeconomic policies鈥, the embassy reported in December 2006 that it would ramp up 鈥渆fforts to explain to the broader public the need to improve competitiveness and take advantage of globalization鈥.
The cable identified 鈥渞edlines鈥, which 鈥渋f crossed, should trigger an appropriate USG [US government] response鈥. In the economic sphere, these redlines were:
鈥淓cuador defaults on bilateral, multilateral or commercial debt. Dramatic increase in GOE regulation of the banking sector that forces Citibank out of Ecuador.
鈥淕OE refuses to respect arbitral decision regarding seized Occidental Petroleum assets or seeks to terminate BIT [bilateral investment treaty]鈥.
Resource nationalism
In October 2007, Correa raised questions in Washington when he issued a decree raising the Ecuadorian government鈥檚 share of oil companies鈥 windfall petroleum revenues from 50% to 99%.
The petroleum windfall tax had first been enacted during the administration of Correa鈥檚 predecessor, Alfredo Palacio, in March 2006. The law had angered US Ambassador Linda Jewell who saw it as a populist measure which threatened US interests and violated the 鈥渟anctity of contracts鈥. US company City Oriente subsequently filed for international arbitration to challenge the law.
Not long after Correa鈥檚 decree, Jewell responded to questions from Washington on the 鈥済rowth of resource nationalism in Ecuador鈥. While concluding that the Ecuadorian government鈥檚 actions 鈥渁ppear to be motivated by resource nationalism鈥, the Ambassador cautioned: 鈥渢he USG cannot be out in front of the resource nationalism issue in Ecuador since we believe that doing so would back-fire, increasing nationalist sentiments and complicating the efforts of US companies to secure negotiated settlements.鈥
Instead, the Jewell promised that 鈥渨e have and will continue to work the issue quietly behind the scenes, following the lead of affected companies鈥. She suggested that 鈥淲ashington encourage broader U.S. associations, such as petroleum associations and other groups, to explain in the region the net benefits of the companies' presence鈥, with 鈥渁n emphasis on companies' corporate social responsibility programs鈥.
Economic uncertainty
After its first year in office, Jewell concluded that the Correa administration鈥檚 鈥渞hetoric was usually appreciably worse than the economic policies that it actually implemented鈥. A cable from February 2008 included a 鈥渟corecard鈥 comparing the government鈥檚 words with its actions.
For example, Jewell wrote that while the government had said that it might default on illegitimate foreign debt, in practice Ecuador had met its debt obligations. And while the government had announced it would terminate its bilateral investment treaty with the US, it had not followed through with this.
In 2008, however, there were early signs that Ecuador might stray further from the economic path set for it by the US. In February 2008, Correa protested when the US Director of National Intelligence testified to the US Congress that Correa鈥檚 government was pursuing policies which 鈥渆mphasize economic nationalism at the expense of market-based approaches鈥.
According to a cable from 13 February, Correa sent a diplomatic note to the Embassy criticising the US for questioning Ecuador鈥檚 鈥渇reedom to exercise its sovereignty and the right of self-determination, central pillars of international law, to choose the economic model that best harmonizes with the interests of the Ecuadorian society鈥.
A few days later, Jewell anticipated that the coming year would bring 鈥渓ess rhetoric, more changes and continued uncertainty鈥. The cable reported that Correa had a 鈥渉ighly ambitious economic agenda for 2008鈥 and was planning new legislation in the areas of banking, mining, public sector enterprises and public sector procurement, as well as new labour and competition laws.
One positive outcome in 2008, from the US Embassy鈥檚 point of view, was the Correa government鈥檚 adoption of a USAID-designed 鈥減roduction and investment promotion program鈥.
As the cables from Ecuador illustrate, USAID is used by the US government to push its model of neoliberal capitalism onto developing countries. In this instance, the Embassy clearly believed that USAID had directly influenced Ecuadorian government policy.
'Lurch to the left'
By the beginning of 2009, however, the Embassy was lamenting the loss of the 鈥淐orrea we thought we knew鈥 and warning of his government鈥檚 鈥渓urch to the left鈥.
In March 2008, a Colombian bombardment killed 20 people in a FARC camp near the border, and provoked a diplomatic crisis between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. The US had defended Colombia鈥檚 actions and was believed by many Ecuadorians to have helped carry out the bombing raid.
Correa subsequently ended Ecuadorian-US intelligence cooperation and in July 2008 gave the Embassy official notice that the lease on the US forward operating base at Manta would not be renewed. New US Ambassador Heather Hodges took the 鈥渢he undiplomatic delivery of the diplomatic note鈥 terminating the agreement of as worrying sign of deteriorating relations. The note had been faxed to the Embassy moments after the press had been notified of the decision.
According to Hodges, Correa鈥檚 鈥渓urch鈥 was further evidenced by his trips to Iran and Cuba, where he had criticised US imperialism. Correa had also invited the Ambassadors of Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Iran, China and Russia for a New Year鈥檚 lunch 鈥 鈥渁 slap in the face鈥, according to Hodges, for members of the diplomatic corps who had not been invited.
Moreover, the Correa government had announced in December 2008 that it would default on Ecuador鈥檚 commercial debt, crossing one of the 鈥渞edlines鈥 the embassy had set for it in December 2006.
Correa had also 鈥渁ligned Ecuador more closely with the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) by attending its meeting in Venezuela on November 26, although still without becoming a full member鈥.
ALBA was founded by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004 as an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which the Bush administration was trying to push on Latin America. Bolivia joined ALBA in 2006, Nicaragua in 2007 and Dominica in 2008.
In contrast to the FTAA, ALBA鈥檚 aim is to promote development in member states through trade based on complimentarity and reciprocity rather than competition. The initial agreement between Cuba and Venezuela facilitated the exchange of medical and education resources from Cuba with oil from Venezuela.
Hodges wrote: 鈥渨e are conveying the message in private that Correa's actions will have consequences for his relationship with the new Obama Administration, while avoiding public comments that would be counterproductive鈥. However, the Embassy did 鈥渘ot recommend terminating any USG programs that serve our interests since that would only weaken the incentive for Correa to move back into a more pragmatic mode鈥.
Deteriorating relations
It wasn鈥檛 long before Ecuadorian-US relations took another turn for the worse over Ecuador鈥檚 refusal to submit to US dictates.
The US had objected to Ecuador鈥檚 appointment of a new head of a joint Ecuadorian-US police unit on the grounds that it had been made without US involvement. On January 8, a US attach茅 wrote to the Ecuadorian government saying that the US would withdraw financial support for the unit.
In response, Correa announced that his government would expel the American attache who wrote the letter, and told that the US that it could keep its 鈥渄irty money鈥. Speculating in a cable as to the reasons for this reaction, Hodges wrote that Correa had 鈥渞eturned a few days earlier from a trip to Venezuela, where Chavez may have pressed him to be more critical of the United States or where his revolutionary fervor may have been re-energized鈥.
In June 2009, Ecuador became a full member of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), marking a shift further away from the US sphere of influence and closer to Ecuador鈥檚 regional allies.
[This is the fifth part of a seven-part series investigating about 1000 cables leaked by the US Embassy in Quito and published by WikiLeaks, most of which have not been reported on in English before.]
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