Jon Lamb
Six months after his election, the cracks are well and truly appearing in the promises and policies of Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The half-hearted support of the Indonesian masses for his presidency is rapidly evaporating as he continues to implement World Bank and International Monetary Fund austerity measures. The humanitarian crisis and heavy-handed response of the Indonesian military to the pro-independence movement in Aceh are fuelling additional political problems.
91×ÔÅÄÂÛ̳ Weekly spoke to People's Democratic Party (PRD) international affairs representative Zely Ariane, a guest speaker at the Asia Pacific International Solidarity Conference held in Sydney at Easter, about these and other issues surrounding Yudhoyono's presidency.
"The people now know that the president has lied and has lied many times", said Ariane. "The first lie relates to Aceh. Since November 19, Yudhoyono has placed Aceh under a state of emergency. Then he continued the policy of sending more troops to Aceh.
"Then on the issue of corruption, he promised within three months that there would be a major crackdown ... but no-one has been charged or jailed. The cronies and corrupt business leaders, especially those linked to the family of ex-president Suharto, knew that they would not be jailed. So people know the president is lying on this issue as well."
Fuel price rises
To help offset the impact of the economic reforms, such as the removal of subsidies on fuel, Yudhoyono promised to improve welfare and to lower the prices on certain goods and services. But these improvements have either failed to materialise or have not made a difference to those people whom they are supposed to assist.
"In the first month after he was elected, the people still had much hope in Yudhoyono" and believed that "he should be given some more time and opportunity because of the situation he inherited from the former government under Gus Dur and Megawati Sukarnoputri", Ariane said. "But after the fuel price hike, the situation is completely different."
Ariane explained: "Even as early as November and December, the government announced that there would be a fuel price hike soon, but it was not confident to say when because it knew how the people would respond to this increase. SBY [Yudhoyono] tried to hide the fuel price hike through various policies, so the people knew he was not to be trusted."
The fuel price increase "is a very critical issue for people", yet has been met with a mixed response. The organised movement among student and activist groups has so far been unable to tap the discontent and spontaneous response from the hardest hit sectors of Indonesian society.
"The fuel price movement has not been able to respond strongly because it is weak at the moment. It is mostly student groups who have been the main force behind it, who have been used by the parliamentary elite. Their political independence is not strong. After the parliament approved the fuel price hike, the student movement became less active, especially some of the Islamic student groups linked to parties in the parliament.
"It is a difficult situation, because those outside the organised student movement, the spontaneous movement — especially amongst the urban poor and those such as drivers and small vendors — they are ready to fight this fuel price hike, but they have no partner in the form of the student organisations."
Aceh
Ariane believes that the situation in Aceh is another sign of the ongoing erosion of human rights and democracy in Indonesia under Yudhoyono. The tsunami disaster has been used by the Indonesian military (TNI) to further strengthen its presence in Aceh and hound the guerilla fighters of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Through her involvement with SEGERA, a coalition of Aceh solidarity organisations, Ariane has seen firsthand the role of the military in Aceh.
"The day after the tsunami, the head of the military lied when he said 40,000 troops would be sent to Aceh and the troops would be divided equally between humanitarian help and operations seeking GAM. In fact, they only mobilised 10,000 troops to help the people and 30,000 to chase GAM in the mountains.
"SEGERA recorded the TNI activities in Aceh after the tsunami until the end of February ... it is clear that TNI forces are the ones that are starting the conflict."
The arrival and large presence of foreign aid workers and international troops made a big difference. According to Ariane, "They helped a lot, because the Indonesian military was unable to do so ... these 10,000 TNI were not really helping ... we could not readily see them helping in the streets. If we did see them, they were going everywhere with their guns, even when recovering dead bodies."
Under pressure from the Indonesian government, countries that sent troops to help with aid and reconstruction efforts have, or are in the process of, completely withdrawing their troops. Significant restrictions have been imposed on the movements of foreign aid workers and journalists outside the capital, Banda Aceh.
"On this issue of the international troops leaving quickly, this is a very contentious one for Jakarta. Especially because the actual humanitarian role of the TNI is not a high profile one ... for example, the US troops were the first to make contact with the city of Meulaboh, not the TNI."
Yudhoyono and the Indonesian government are extremely sensitive to outside perceptions about the TNI's role in Aceh, hence some tense debates and public discussion over the latest round of negotiations in Helsinki with GAM representatives.
Ariane believes: "The approach to negotiate with GAM in Helsinki is a tactical differentiation by the military and the government towards the GAM leadership in Sweden and the GAM based in Aceh. That's why they have agreed to the proposal of talks."
"There is a lot of hope for these talks", explained Ariane. GAM "decreased its demands" in the first round. "It didn't insist on independence", but proposed "self-government through autonomy, the involvement of local political parties and that the Indonesian government must withdraw troops. It is a start."
"We support this process and campaign around it in Jakarta, through SEGERA and in Aceh through FPDRA [the Acehnese People's Democratic Resistance Front]. But it seems the Indonesian government and the parliament doesn't want this process to continue. TNI does not want the negotiations to continue. We are sure of that. They do not want peace in Aceh.
"The negotiations and ceasefire issue was 'accepted' by the government after the international troops arrived in Aceh. The Indonesian government was under pressure to open Aceh. But there was not a united voice to solve the situation in Aceh peacefully. That is why when President SBY and the government partook in the Helsinki talks, the parliament was so angry — 'You cannot have a meeting in Finland, it must be in Indonesia!'."
"Still during the negotiations in Helsinki, the statements of the military and the parliament in Jakarta are completely contradictory. [TNI chief General Endriartono] Sutarto said that if the Acehnese insist on self-government and they insist on local political parties, then this means war."
True to his words, TNI forces killed six suspected GAM members within two days of the latest round of talks, which began on April 12. There have also been reports of troops kidnapping family members of GAM fighters. The TNI announced on April 14 that an extra 3000 troops would be sent to Aceh (plus three battalions to West Papua, which is also under extreme military repression).
Military ties
The US announced in late February that it would resume the International Military Education and Training program (IMET) with Indonesia. (The program was suspended in 1991 and then completely halted in 1999.)
Ariane is adamant that Australian-Indonesian military ties should not be strengthened. "The TNI hasn't changed ... the way they acted in East Timor, the way they behaved under Suharto has not changed. Their activity in Aceh and the secret war in Papua reveal the genuine character of the TNI.
"I think if the Australian people were really aware of what's going on, then they would demand that aid goes to the people, not the military. The aid must be in the hands of the people, not the control of the military. We can't trust the TNI ... so we call for pressure to stop the war in Aceh and the war in Papua."
From 91×ÔÅÄÂÛ̳ Weekly, May 11, 2005.
Visit the